Abstract. We describe implementations for solving the discrete logarithm problem in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field and in the infrastructure of a real quadratic field. The algorithms used incorporate improvements over previously-used algorithms, and extensive numerical results are presented demonstrating their efficiency. This data is used as the basis for extrapolations, used to provide recommendations for parameter sizes providing approximately the same level of security as block ciphers with 80, 112, 128, 192, and 256-bit symmetric keys.
Introduction
Quadratic fields were proposed as a setting for public-key cryptosystems in the late 1980s by Buchmann and Williams [7, 8] . There are two types of quadratic fields, imaginary and real. In the imaginary case, cryptosystems are based on arithmetic in the ideal class group (a finite abelian group), and the discrete logarithm problem is the computational problem on which the security is based. In the real case, the so-called infrastructure is used instead, and the security is based on the analogue of the discrete logarithm problem in this structure, namely the principal ideal problem.
Although neither of these problems is resistant to quantum computers, cryptography in quadratic fields is nevertheless an interesting alternative to more widely-used settings. Both discrete logarithm problems can be solved in subexponential time using index calculus algorithms, but with asymptotically slower complexity than the state-of-the art algorithms for integer factorization and computing discrete logarithms in finite fields. In addition, the only known relationship to the quadratic field discrete logarithm problems from other computational problems used in cryptography is that integer factorization reduces to both of the quadratic field problems. Thus, both of these are at least as hard as ⋆ The second author is supported in part by NSERC of Canada.
factoring, and the lack of known relationships to other computational problems implies that the breaking of other cryptosystems, such as those based on elliptic or hyperelliptic curves, will not necessarily break those set in quadratic fields. Examining the security of quadratic field based cryptosystems is therefore of interest.
The fastest algorithms for solving discrete logarithm problem in quadratic fields are based on an improved version of Buchmann's index-calculus algorithm due to Jacobson [17] . The algorithms include a number of practical enhancements to the original algorithm of Buchmann [5] , including the use of self-initialized sieving to generate relations, a single large prime variant, and practice-oriented algorithms for the required linear algebra. These algorithms enabled the computation of a discrete logarithm in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field with 90 decimal digit discriminant [15] , and the solution of the principal ideal problem for a real quadratic field with 65 decimal digit discriminant [18] .
Since this work, a number of further improvements have been proposed. Biasse [3] presented practical improvements to the corresponding algorithm for imaginary quadratic fields, including a double large prime variant and improved algorithms for the required linear algebra. The resulting algorithm was indeed faster then the previous state-of-the-art and enabled the computation of the ideal class group of an imaginary quadratic field with 110 decimal digit discriminant. These improvements were adapted to the case of real quadratic fields by Biasse and Jacobson [4] , along with the incorporation of a batch smoothness test of Bernstein [2] , resulting in similar speed-ups in that case.
In this paper, we adapt the improvements of Biasse and Jacobson to the computation of discrete logarithms in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field and the principal ideal problem in the infrastructure of a real quadratic field. We use versions of the algorithms that rely on easier linear algebra problems than those described in [17] . In the imaginary case, this idea is due to Vollmer [26] ; our work represents the first implementation of his method. Our data obtained shows that our algorithms are indeed faster than previous methods. We use our data to estimate parameter sizes for quadratic field cryptosystems that offer security equivalent to NIST's five recommended security levels [25] . In the imaginary case, these recommendations update previous results of Hamdy and Möller [14] , and in the real case this is the first time such recommendations have been provided. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly recall the required background of ideal arithmetic in quadratic fields, and give an overview of the index-calculus algorithms for solving the two discrete logarithms in Section 3. Our numerical results are described in Section 4, followed by the security parameter estimates in Section 5.
Arithmetic in Quadratic Fields
We begin with a brief overview of arithmetic in quadratic fields. For more details on the theory, algorithms, and cryptographic applications of quadratic fields, see [20] .
be the quadratic field of discriminant ∆, where ∆ is a nonzero integer congruent to 0 or 1 modulo 4 with ∆ or ∆/4 square-free. The integral closure of Z in K, called the maximal order, is denoted by O ∆ . The ideals of O ∆ are the main objects of interest in terms of cryptographic applications. An ideal can be represented by the two dimensional Z-module
where a, b, s ∈ Z and 4a | b 2 − ∆. The integers a and s are unique, and b is defined modulo 2a. The ideal a is said to be primitive if s = 1. The norm of a is given by N (a) = as 2 . Ideals can be multiplied using Gauss' composition formulas for integral binary quadratic forms. Ideal norm respects this operation. The prime ideals of O ∆ have the form pZ+ (b p + √ ∆)/2Z where p is a prime that is split or ramified in K, i.e., the Kronecker symbol (∆/p) = −1. As O ∆ is a Dedekind domain, every ideal can be factored uniquely as a product of prime ideals. To factor a, it suffices to factor N (a) and, for each prime p dividing the norm, determine whether the prime ideal p or p −1 divides a according to whether b is congruent to
Two ideals a, b are said to be equivalent, denoted by a ∼ b, if there exist α, β ∈ O ∆ such that (α)a = (β)b, where (α) denotes the principal ideal generated by α. This is in fact an equivalence relation, and the set of equivalence classes forms a finite abelian group called the class group, denoted by Cl ∆ . Its order is called the class number, and is denoted by h ∆ .
Arithmetic in the class group is performed on reduced ideal representatives of the equivalence classes. An ideal a is reduced if it is primitive and N (a) is a minimum in a. Reduced ideals have the property that a, b < |∆|, yielding reasonably small representatives of each group element. The group operation then consists of multiplying two reduced ideals and computing a reduced ideal equivalent to the product. This operation is efficient and can be performed in O(log 2 |∆|) bit operations. In the case of imaginary quadratic fields, we have h ∆ ≈ |∆|, and that every element in Cl ∆ contains exactly one reduced ideal. Thus, the ideal class group can be used as the basis of most public-key cryptosystems that require arithmetic in a finite abelian group. The only wrinkle is that computing the class number h ∆ seems to be as hard as solving the discrete logarithm problem, so only cryptosystems for which the group order is not known can be used.
In real quadratic fields, the class group tends to be small; in fact, a conjecture of Gauss predicts that h ∆ = 1 infinitely often, and the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics [11] predict that this happens about 75% of the time for prime discriminants. Thus, the discrete logarithm problem in the class group is not in general suitable for cryptographic use.
Another consequence of small class groups in the real case is that there are no longer unique reduced ideal representatives in each equivalence class. Instead, we have that h ∆ R ∆ ≈ √ ∆, where the regulator R ∆ roughly approximates how many reduced ideals are in each equivalence class. Thus, since h ∆ is frequently small, there are roughly √ ∆ equivalent reduced ideals in each equivalence class. The infrastructure, namely the set of reduced principal ideals, is used for cryptographic purposes instead of the class group. Although this structure is not a finite abelian group, the analogue of exponentiation (computing a reduced principal ideal (α) with log α as close to a given number as possible) is efficient and can be used as a one-way problem suitable for public-key cryptography. The inverse of this problem, computing an approximation of the unknown log α from a reduced principal ideal given in Z-basis representation, is called the principal ideal problem or infrastructure discrete logarithm problem, and is believed to be of similar difficulty to the discrete logarithm problem in the class group of an imaginary quadratic field.
Solving The Discrete Logarithm Problems
The fastest algorithms in practice for computing discrete logarithms in the class group and infrastructure use the index-calculus framework. Like other indexcalculus algorithms, these algorithms rely on finding certain smooth quantities, those whose prime divisors are all small in some sense. In the case of quadratic fields, one searches for smooth principal ideals for which all prime ideal divisors have norm less than a given bound B. The set of prime ideals p 1 , . . . , p n with N (p i ) ≤ B is called the factor base, denoted by B.
A principal ideal (α) = p e1 1 · · · p en n with α ∈ K that factors completely over the factor base yields the relation (e 1 , . . . , e n , log |α|). In the imaginary case, the log |α| coefficients are not required and are ignored. The key to the index-calculus approach is the fact, proved by Buchmann [5] , that the set of all relations forms a sublattice Λ ⊂ Z n × R of determinant h ∆ R ∆ as long as the prime ideals in the factor base generate Cl ∆ . This follows, in part, due to the fact that L, the integer component of Λ, is the kernel of the homomorphism φ :
In the imaginary case, where the log |α| terms are omitted, the relation lattice consists only of the integer part, and the corresponding results were proved by Hafner and McCurley [12] .
The main idea behind the algorithms described in [17] for solving the class group and infrastructure discrete logarithm problems is to find random relations until they generate the entire relation lattice Λ. Suppose A is a matrix whose rows contain the integer coordinates of the relations, and v is a vector containing the real parts. To check whether the relations generate Λ, we begin by computing the Hermite normal form of A and then calculating its determinant, giving us a multiple h of the class number h ∆ . We also compute a multiple of the regulator R ∆ . Using the analytic class number formula and Bach's L(1, χ)-approximation method [1] , we construct bounds such that h ∆ R ∆ itself is the only integer multiple of the product of the class number and regulator satisfying h * < h ∆ < 2h * ; if hR satisfies these bounds, then h and R are the correct class number and regulator and the set of relations given in A generates Λ.
A multiple R of the regulator R ∆ can be computed either from a basis of the kernel of the row-space of A (as in [17] ) or by randomly sampling from the kernel as described by Vollmer [27] . Every kernel vector x corresponds to a multiple of the regulator via x · v = mR ∆ . Given v and a set of kernel vectors, an algorithm of Maurer [24, Sec 12 .1] is used to compute the "real GCD" of the regulator multiples with guaranteed numerical accuracy, where the real GCD of m 1 R ∆ and m 2 R ∆ is defined to be gcd(m 1 , m 2 )R ∆ .
To solve the discrete logarithm problem in Cl ∆ , we compute the structure of Cl ∆ , i.e., integers m 1 , . . . , m k with m i+1 | m i for i = 1, . . . , k − 1 such that
x ∼ a, we find ideals equivalent to g and a that factor over the factor base and maps these vectors in Z n to Z/m 1 Z × · · · × Z/m k , where the discrete logarithm problem can be solved easily.
To solve the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem for a, we find an ideal equivalent to a that factors over the factor base. Suppose the factorization is given by v ∈ Z n . Then, since L is the kernel of φ, if a is principal, v must be a linear combination of the elements of L. This can be determined by solving xA = v, where as before the rows of A are the vectors in L. Furthermore, we have log α = x · v (mod R ∆ ) is a solution to the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem. The approximation of log α is computed to guaranteed numerical accuracy using another algorithm of Maurer [24, Sec 5.5] .
If it is necessary to verify the solvability of the problem instance, then one must verify that the relations generate all of Λ, for example, as described above. The best methods for this certification are conditional on the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis, both for their expected running time and their correctness. However, in a cryptographic application, it can safely be assumed that the problem instance does have a solution (for example, if it comes from the DiffieHellman key exchange protocol), and simplifications are possible. In particular, the correctness of the computed solution can be determined without certifying that the relations generate Λ, for example, by verifying that g x = a. As a result, the relatively expensive linear algebra required (computing Hermite normal form and kernel of the row space) can be replaced by linear system solving.
In the imaginary case, if the discrete logarithm is known to exist, one can use an algorithm due to Vollmer [26, 28] . Instead of computing the structure of Cl ∆ , one finds ideals equivalent to g and a that factor over the factor base. Then, combining these factorizations with the rest of the relations and solving a linear system yields a solution of the discrete logarithm problem. If the linear system cannot be solved, then the relations do not generate Λ, and the process is simply repeated after generating some additional relations. The expected asymptotic complexity of this method, under reasonable assumptions about the generation of relations, is O( 6] , where
for e, c constants and 0 ≤ e ≤ 1. In practice, all the improvements to relation generation and simplifying the relation matrix described in [3] can be applied. When using practical versions for generating relations, such as sieving as described in [17] , it is conjectured that the algorithm has complexity O(
In the real case, we also do not need to compute the Hermite normal form, as only a multiple of R ∆ suffices. The consequence of not certifying that we have the true regulator is that the solutions obtained for the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem may not be minimal. However, for cryptographic purposes this is sufficient, as these values can still be used to break the corresponding protocols in the same way that a non-minimal solution to the discrete logarithm problem suffices to break group-based protocols. Thus, we use Vollmer's approach [27] based on randomly sampling from the kernel of A. This method computes a multiple that is with high probability equal to the regulator in time
by computing the multiple corresponding to random elements in the kernel of the row space of A. These random elements can also be found by linear system solving. The resulting algorithm has the same complexity as that in the imaginary case. In practice, all the improvements described in [4] can be applied. When these are used, including sieving as described in [17] , we also conjecture that the algorithm has complexity O(L |∆| [1/2, 1 + o(1)]).
Implementation and Numerical Results
Our implementation takes advantage of the latest practical improvements in ideal class group computation and regulator computation for quadratic number fields, described in detail in [3, 4] . In the following, we give a brief outline of the methods we used for the experiments described in this paper.
To speed up the relation collection phase, we combined the double large prime variation with the self-initialized quadratic sieve strategy of [17] , as descried in [3] . This results in a considerable speed-up in the time required for finding a relation, at the cost of a growth of the dimensions of the relation matrix. We also used Bernstein's batch smoothness test [2] to enhance the relation collection phase as described in [4] , by simultaneously testing residues produced by the sieve for smoothness.
The algorithms involved in the linear algebra phase are highly sensitive to the dimensions of the relation matrix. As the double large prime variation induces significant growth in the dimensions of the relation matrix, one needs to perform Gaussian elimination to reduce the number of columns in order to make the linear algebra phase feasible. We used a graph-based elimination strategy first described by Cavallar [9] for factorization, and then adapted by Biasse [3] to the context of quadratic fields. At the end of the process, we test if the resulting matrix A red has full rank by reducing it modulo a word-sized prime. If not, we collect more relation and repeat the algorithm.
For solving the discrete logarithm problem in the imaginary case, we implemented the algorithm due to Vollmer [26, 28] . Given two ideals a and g such that g
x ∼ a for some integer x, we find two extra relations (e 1 , . . . , e n , 1, 0) and (f 1 , . . . , f n , 0, 1) such that p The extra relations are obtained by multiplying a −1 and g by random power products of primes in B and sieving with the resulting ideal to find an equivalent ideal that is smooth over B. Once these relations have been found, we construct the matrix
and solve the system xA ′ = (0, . . . , 0, 1). The last coordinate of x necessarily equals the discrete logarithm x. We used certSolveRedLong from the IML library [10] to solve these linear systems.
As the impact of Vollmer's and Bernstein's algorithms on the overall time for class group and discrete logarithm computation in the imaginary case had not been studied, we provide numerical data in Table 1 for discriminants of size between 140 and 220 bits. The timings, given in seconds, are averages of three different random prime discriminants, obtained with 2.4 GHz Opterons with 8GB or memory. We denote by "DL" the discrete logarithm computation using Vollmer's method and by "CL" the class group computation. "CL Batch" and "DL Batch" denote the times obtained when also using Bernstein's algorithm. We list the optimal factor base size for each algorithm and discriminant size (obtained via additional numerical experiments), the time for each of the main parts of the algorithm, and the total time. In all cases we allowed two large primes and took enough relations to ensure that A red have full rank. Our results show that enhancing relation generation with Bernstein's algorithm is beneficial in all cases. In addition, using Vollmer's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms is faster than the approach of [17] that also requires the class group.
To solve the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem, we first need to compute an approximation of the regulator. For this purpose, we used an improved version of Vollmer's system solving based algorithm [27] described by Biasse and Jacobson [4] . In order to find elements of the kernel, the algorithm creates extra relations r i , 0 ≤ i ≤ k for some small integer k (in our experiments, we always have k ≤ 10). Then, we solve the k linear systems X i A = r i using the function certSolveRedLong from the IML library [10] . We augment the matrix A by adding the r i as extra rows, and augment the vectors X i with k − 1 zero coefficients and a −1 coefficient at index n + i, yielding
The X ′ i are kernel vectors of A ′ , which can be used along with the vector v containing the real parts of the relations, to compute a multiple of the regulator with Maurer's algorithm [24, Sec 12.1] . As shown in Vollmer [27] , this multiple is equal to the regulator with high probability. In [4] , it is shown that this method is faster than the one requiring a kernel basis because it only requires the solution to a few linear systems, and it can be adapted in such a way that the linear system involves A red . Our algorithm to solve the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem also makes use of the system solving algorithm. The input ideal a is first decomposed over the factor base, as in the imaginary case, yielding the factorization a = (γ)p 1 e1 · · · p n en . Then, we solve the system xA = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) and compute a numerical approximation to guaranteed precision of log |α| modulo our regulator multiple using Maurer's algorithm [24, Sec 5.5] from γ, the coefficients of x, and the real parts of the relation stored in v.
The results of our experiments for the imaginary case are given in Table 2 , and for the real case in Table 3 . They were obtained on 2.4 GHz Xeon with 2GB of memory. For each bit length of ∆, denoted by "size(∆)," we list the average time in seconds required to solve an instance of the appropriate discrete logarithm problem (t ∆ ) and standard deviation (std). In the imaginary case, for each discriminant size less than 220 bits, 14 instances of the discrete logarithm problem were solved. For size 230 and 256 we solved 10, and for size 280 and 300 we solved 5 examples. In the real case, 10 instances were solved for each size up to 256, 6 for size 280, and 4 for size 300. Table 2 . Average run times for the discrete logarithm problem in Cl∆, ∆ < 0 Table 2 and Table 3 . In both cases, our data supports the hypothesis that the run time of our algorithm is indeed closer to O(L |∆| [1/2, 1 + o(1)]), with the exception of a few outliers corresponding to instances where only a few instances of the discrete logarithm were computed for that size,
Security Estimates
General purpose recommendations for securely choosing discriminants for use in quadratic field cryptography can be found in [14] for the imaginary case and [18] for the real case. In both cases, it usually suffices to use prime discriminants, as this forces the class number h ∆ to be odd. In the imaginary case, one then relies on the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics [11] to guarantee that the class number is not smooth with high probability. In the real case, one uses the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics to guarantee that the class number is very small (and that the infrastructure is therefore large) with high probability.
Our goal is to estimate what bit lengths of appropriately-chosen discriminants, in both the imaginary and real cases, are required to provide approximately the same level of security as the RSA moduli recommended by NIST [25] . The five security levels recommended by NIST correspond to using secure block ciphers with keys of 80, 112, 128, 192, and 256 bits. The estimates used by NIST indicate that RSA moduli of size 1024, 2048, 3072, 7680, and 15360 should be used.
To estimate the required sizes of discriminants, we follow the approach of Hamdy and Möller [14] , who provided such estimates for the imaginary case. Our results update these in the sense that our estimates are based on our improved algorithms for solving the discrete logarithms in quadratic fields, as well as the latest data available for factoring large RSA moduli. Our estimates for real quadratic fields are the first such estimates produced.
Following, Hamdy and Möller, suppose that an algorithm with asymptotic running time L N [e, c] runs in time t 1 on input N 1 . Then, the running time t 2 of the algorithm on input N 2 can be estimated using the equation
We can also use the equation to estimate an input N 2 that will cause the algorithm to have running time t 2 , again given the time t 1 for input N 1 . The first step is to estimate the time required to factor the RSA numbers of the sizes recommended by NIST. The best algorithm for factoring large integers is the generalized number field sieve [22] , whose asymptotic running time is heuristically L N [1/3, 3 64/9 + o(1)]. To date, the largest RSA number factored is RSA-768, a 768 bit integer [21] . It is estimated in [21] that the total computation required 2000 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron years. As our computations were performed on a different architecture, we follow Hamdy and Möller and use the MIPS-year measurement to provide an architecture-neutral measurement. In this case, assuming that a 2.2 GHz AMD Opteron runs at 4400 MIPS, we estimate that this computation took 8.8 × 10
6 MIPS-years. Using this estimate in conjunction with (1) yields the estimated running times to factor RSA moduli of the sizes recommended by NIST given in Table 4 . When using this method, we use N 1 = 2 768 and N 2 = 2 b , where b is the bit length of the RSA moduli for which we compute a run time estimate.
The second step is to estimate the discriminant sizes for which the discrete logarithm problems require approximately the same running time. The results in Table 2 and Table 3 suggest that L N [1/2, 1 + o (1)] is a good estimate of the asymptotic running time for both algorithms. Thus, we use L N [1/2, 1] in (1), as ignoring the o(1) results in a conservative under-estimate of the actual running time. For N 1 and t 1 , we take the largest discriminant size in each table for which at least 10 instances of the discrete logarithm problem were run and the corresponding running time (in MIPS-years); thus we used 256 in the imaginary case and 230 in the real case. We take for t 2 the target running time in MIPSyears. To convert the times in seconds from Table 2 and Table 3 to MIPS-years, we assume that the 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon machine runs at 4800 MIPS. To find the corresponding discriminant size, we simply find the smallest integer b for which
Our results are listed in Table 4 . We list the size in bits of RSA moduli (denoted by "RSA"), discriminants of imaginary quadratic fields (denoted by "∆ (imaginary)"), and real quadratic fields (denoted by "∆ (real") for which factoring and the quadratic field discrete logarithm problems all have the same estimated running time. For comparison purposes, we also list the discriminant sizes recommended in [14] , denoted by "∆ (imaginary, old)." Note that these estimates were based on different equivalent MIPS-years running times, as the largest factoring effort at the time was RSA-512. In addition, they are based on an implementation of the imaginary quadratic field discrete logarithm algorithm from [17] , which is slower than the improved version from this paper. Consequently, our security parameter estimates are slightly larger than those from [14] . We note also that the recommended discriminant sizes are slightly smaller in the real case, as the infrastructure discrete logarithm problem requires more time to solve on average than the discrete logarithm in the imaginary case.
Conclusions
It is possible to produce more accurate security parameter estimates by taking more factors into account as is done, for example, by Lenstra and Verheul [23] , as well as using a more accurate performance measure than MIPS-year. However, our results nevertheless provide a good rough guideline on the required discrim-
